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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
Double Jeopardy-Sentencing-

GOVERNMENT

APPEAL OF DANGER-

OUS SPECIAL OFFENDER SENTENCE VIOLATES DOUBLE JEOPARDY
CLAUSE

United States v. DiFrancesco,
604 F.2d 769 (2d. Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
48 U.S.L.W. 3514 (Feb. 19, 1980)

In 1969, Congress recognized that organized crime figures
consistently received significantly lower sentences than ordinary
convicted offenders.'
As part of its corrective action, Congress
enacted the Dangerous Special Offender (DSO) provisions of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.2 The provisions authorize
federal courts to impose enhanced maximum sentences upon
specified offenders. 3 In addition, the DSO statute provides for
4
prosecutorially initiated appellate review of such sentences.
In 1977, the Department of Justice first sought review of a
DSO sentence. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in United
States v. DiFrancesco,5 rejected the government's request for an
enhanced sentence and held the DSO review provisions unconstitutional under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 6

1 A staff study by the Senate Criminal Laws Subcommittee reported that two-thirds of
La Cosa Nostra members indicted by the federal government since 1960 received
maximum sentences of five years or less. See S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 85
(1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; 115 CONG. REC. 34,389 (1969) (statement of
Sen. McClellan); Memorandum Embodying Results of Staff Study, id. at 34,390. See also
McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) Or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46
NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 146-49 (1970).
2 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1001, 84 Stat. 992 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-78
(1976)).
3 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1976).
4 Id. § 3576.
3 605 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3514 (Feb. 19, 1980).
6 Prior cases construing the DSO provisions did not consider the double jeopardy
implications of the government's attempt to appeal a sentence imposed under § 3575. See
United States v. Ilacqua, 562 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 917 (1978);
United States v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976);
United States v. Duardi, 529 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1975).
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I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. The Dangerous Special Offender Statute
Senator John L. McClellan, sponsor of the bill that led to the
DSO provisions, argued that sentencing maximums set by Congress to "reduce the risk of abusively high sentences for ordinary
criminals ... are too lenient to protect society by confining recidivists, professionals, and organized criminals." 7 Heeding the

Senator's warning, Congress enacted a statute that, while sensitive
to the convicted criminal's interests, assures both individualized
punishment and uniform sentencing standards developed by appellate review.
The DSO statute requires a federal prosecutor to notify the
defendant and the court before trial of his intention to seek an
enhanced sentence. 9 If the defendant is found guilty of the underlying offense, the court must hold a separate hearing to determine if the defendant is a dangerous special offender.II Three
types of convicted felons are subject to the special sentencing provisions: recidivists, professional offenders, and organized crime
offenders."1 An offender falling into one of the three categories
must also fit the statute's definition of "dangerous."' 2 If the court
concludes upon a preponderance of the information 13 that the
defendant is both dangerous and a special offender, it may impose an enhanced sentence. 14 The sentence may not be dispro-

Organized Crime Control. Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. # 5 of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1970) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
I For a concise analysis of the DSO provisions and the legislative policy behind them,
see Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement as Amicus Curiae in support of the
United States, United States v. Duardi, 529 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1975), reprinted in 18 CRIsf.
L. REP. (BNA) 3001 (1975).
9 18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) (1976).
10 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976). The hearing must provide the defendant with such procedural safeguards as the right to counsel, compulsory process, cross-examination of all
witnesses, and disclosure of the presentence report and other evidence. Id.
11 See id. § 3575(e).
12 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f) (1976) provides: "A defendant is dangerous for the purpose of
this section if a period of confinement longer than that provided for such felony is required for the protection of the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant."
13 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976).
14 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976) provides in part: "The court shall place in the record its
findings, including an identification of the information relied upon in making such findings, and itsreasons for the sentence imposed." Section 3575(b) also states that if the court
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portionate to the maximum terms otherwise applicable and may
5
not exceed twenty-five years.1
Under section 3576 of the statute, either the government or
the- defendant may obtain appellate review of the sentence. 1 6 The
appellate court must determine whether the sentencing court
abused its discretion, employed unlawful procedures, or made
clearly erroneous findings. 1 7 The reviewing court may affirm,
impose any sentence originally possible, or remand for further

determines the defendant is a dangerous special offender, "the court shall sentence the
defendant to imprisonment for an appropriate term. ... Otherwise it shall sentence the
defendant in accordance with the law prescribing penalties for such felony."
"5 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976).
16 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (1976) states:
With respect to the imposition, correction, or reduction of a sentence after
proceedings under section 3575 of this chapter, a review of the sentence on the
record of the sentencing court may be taken by the defendant or the United
States to a court of appeals. Any review of the sentence taken by the United
States shall be taken at least five days before expiration of the time for taking a
review of the sentence or appeal of the conviction by the defendant and shall
be diligently prosecuted. The sentencing court may, with or without motion
and notice, extend the time for taking a review of the sentence for a period not
to exceed thirty days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by
law. The court shall not extend the time for taking a review of the sentence by
the United States after the time has expired. A court extending the time for taking a review of the sentence by the United States shall extend the time for
taking a review of the sentence or appeal of the conviction by the defendant for
the same period. The taking of a review of sentence by the United States shall
be deemed the taking of a review of the sentence and an appeal of the conviction
by the defendant. Review of the sentence shall include review of whether the procedure employed was lawful, the findings made were clearly erroneous, or the
sentencing court's discretion was abused. The court of appeals on review of the
sentence may, after considering the record, including the entire presentence
report, information submitted during the trial of such felony and the sentencing hearing, and the findings and reasons of the sentencing court, affirm the
sentence, impose or direct the imposition of any sentence which the sentencing
court could originally have imposed, or remand for further sentencing proceedings and impositions of sentence, except that a sentence may be made more
severe only on review of the sentence taken by the United States and after
hearing. Failure of the United States to take a review of the imposition of the
sentence shall, upon review taken by the United States of the correction or
reduction of the sentence, foreclose imposition of a sentence more severe than
that previously imposed. Any withdrawal or dismissal of review of the sentence
taken by the United States shall foreclose imposition of a sentence more severe
than that reviewed but shall not otherwise foreclose the review of the sentence
or the appeal of the conviction. The court of appeals shall state in writing the
reasons for its disposition of the review of the sentence. Any review of the
sentence taken by the United States may be dismissed on a showing of abuse of
the right of the United States to take such review.
17 Id.
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sentencing proceedings.8 Only when the government initiates
review may the appellate court increase the sentence.' 9
B. The Double Jeopardy Clause
Although firmly rooted in English tradition, the double
jeopardy protection never attained the status of a basic right of
citizenship until the framers of the United States Constitution incorporated it into the Bill of Rights. 2 0 The framers considered
different versions of the double jeopardy clause 2 before settling
on its "familiar but unilluminating" language. 2 2 Mandating that
no man should twice be subjected to "jeopardy of life or limb,"
the clause is an imprecise historical vestige. 2 3 Drawing the contours of the double jeopardy guarantee became the task of the
courts.

18 Id.

aaId. The DSO provisions are but one example of congressional attempts to rationalize
the sentencing process. 21 U.S.C. § 849 (1976) provides for enhanced sentences and government appeals of sentences for dangerous special drug offenders. If enacted, § 3725 of
the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) would permit
government appeal of all sentences that diverged from proposed sentencing guidelines.
For a discussion of the double jeopardy implications, see Spence, The Federal Criminal Code
Reform Act of 1977 and ProsecutorialAppeal of Sentences: Justice or Double Jeopardy? 37 MD. L.
REV. 739 (1978); Note, Twice in Jeopardy: ProsecutorialAppeals of Sentences, 63 VA. L. REV.
325 (1977).
For a compilation of state statutes permitting increase of sentences on appeal, see
Dunsky, The Constitutionality of Increasing Sentences on Appellate Review, 69 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 19, 20 n.8 (1978).
21 In early English common law, the double jeopardy protection barred successive trials
by combat among private citizens. By the 15th century, the concept of double jeopardy had
been transformed to a limitation on the prosecutorial power of the state. See J. SIGLER,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 7-16 (1969); Kirk, 'Jeopardy"During the Period of the Year Books, 82 U. PA.
L. REV. 602, 605-09 (1934). Blackstone wrote that the double jeopardy principle was a
"universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into
jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*335. For a comprehensive history of the double jeopardy protection, see Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121, 151-52, 152 n.3 (1959) (dissenting opinion, Black, J.); United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 870 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975), overruled, United States
v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). See also J. SIGLER, supra at 2-4; Sigler, A History of Double
Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIsT. 283 (1963); Note, DoubleJeopardy and Government Appeals
of CriminalDismissals, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 303, 305-09 (1974).
21 United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340-42 (1975). See generally 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 451-52, 781-82, 796 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
22 United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 870 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 358
(1975), overruled, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
23 J. SIGLER, supra note 20, at 33.
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In its struggle to define this guarantee, the Supreme Court
analyzed the policies underlying the clause. 24 Justice Black stated
that:
The underlying idea [of the double jeopardy protection], one
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system
of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him
to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
25
found guilty.

No single principle unifies the double jeopardy guarantee. The
government's interests in enforcing the criminal law compete with

the defendant's interests in repose and in the finality of a judg26

ment.
Double jeopardy protection has been invoked in three archetypal situations. The clause clearly prohibits retrial after a final
judgment of acquittal. In Kepner v. United States,2 7 the Supreme
Court established that a verdict and judgment in the defendant's
favor bars reprosecution. 2 s The defendant's interest in the finality of his judgment after acquittal far outweighs any government
interest in reprosecution. 2 " This policy is so strong that the state
may not retry an acquitted defendant even where the acquittal
was based on egregious error.3 0 Furthermore, the Court has re24 For a general discussion of the policies underlying the double jeopardy clause, see
Fisher, Double Jeopardy: Six Common Boners Summarized, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 81 (1967);
Sigler, FederalDouble Jeopardy Policy, 19 VAND. L. REV. 375 (1966); Note, Twice in Jeopardy,
75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965).
25 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
26 See note 24 supra.
27 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
28 Id. at 130.
21 In United States v. Wilson, 420 US. 332 (1975), the Court recognized the symmetry
of a system which permitted appeal of all verdicts. Nevertheless, the Court declined to
sanction government appeals of acquittals, stating:
Granting the Government such broad ... rights [to appeal acquittals] would
allow the prosecutor to seek to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's guilt after having failed with the first; it would permit him to re-examine
the weaknesses in his first presentation in order to strengthen the second; and
it would disserve the defendant's legitimate interest in the finality of a verdict
of acquittal.
Id. at 352 (dicta).
30 See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (dicta); Fong Foo v. United
States. 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962).
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jected artificial distinctions between acquittals and their less formal counterparts . 3
Nonetheless, the reach of the double
jeopardy clause has limits. The protection against retrial after acquittal does not apply
where a mistrial is declared because of
"manifest necessity" 32 or on the defendant's initiative. 33
The double jeopardy clause also shields the defendant from
reprosecution for the same offense after conviction. Yet the Court
ruled in United States v. Ball3 4 that the double jeopardy guarantee
imposes no limitation upon the state's power to retry a defendant
who has succeeded in having his first conviction set aside on appeal. 3 - At various times, the Court has advanced theories of
waiver 3" and continuing jeopardy 37 to explain the permissibility

"'

See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 392 (1975) ("[A]n 'acquittal' cannot be
divorced from the procedural context in which the action so characterized was taken. ....
The word itself has no talismanic quality for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.");
Note, Double Jeopardy Limitations on Appeals by the Government in Criminal Cases, 80 DIcK. L.
REV. 525, 538-39 (1975-76).
32 In deciding that a declaration of mistrial did not preclude retrial in United States v.
Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824), the Court stated:
We think that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice
with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in
their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the circumstances which would render it proper to interfere.
To be sure, the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent
circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes ...
Other cases have used the "manifest necessity" rationale to justify subordinating the defendant's interest to the government's. See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973)
(retrial allowed where defective indictment dismissed after jury sworn in); Wade v. Hunter,
336 U.S. 684, 690-92 (1949) (retrial allowed where wartime conditions required court martial charges to be withdrawn). But see United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (retrial
barred where court abused discretion in declaring mistrial).
33 In United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607 (1976), the Court held that the "manifest necessity" standard is inapplicable where a mistrial is declared at a defendant's behest.
The double jeopardy clause would not bar reprosecution in the absence of " 'bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor' ... threaten[ing] the 'harassment of an accused ... or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict.'" Id. at 611 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971); Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963)). See also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1977)
(where defendant obtains dismissal on basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, the
double jeopardy clause does not prevent retrial).
34 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
35 Id. at 671-72.
31 In Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905), the Court held that the defendants
"waived" the opportunity to claim double jeopardy protections by appealing their convictions. The trial court had found the defendants guilty of assault but acquitted them of
murder. The Court held that defendant's successful appeal of the assault convictions
opened the murder acquittal to retrial. Reversal of the original convictions "open[s] up the
whole controversy and act[s] upon the original judgment as if it had never been" for the
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of retrial. Neither justification has proved as satisfactory as the
balancing approach espoused by Justice Harlan in United States v.
Tateo 38 and adopted by the Court in Burks v. United States:"
Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial
is the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after
he has obtained such a trial. It would be a high price indeed
for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from
punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute rever40
sible error in the proceedings leading to conviction.
As a necessary corollary, retrial after an appellate reversal of a
conviction is permissible only where reversal was based on trial
41
error rather than on insufficiency of the evidence.
The third branch of the double jeopardy guarantee, the prohibition against multiple punishments, is far more diffuse. The
multiple punishment ban precludes a sentencing court from "exceed[ing] its legislative authorization by imposing multiple
punishments for the same offense." 4 2 Thus, in Ex parte Lange,4 3
the Court held that the double jeopardy clause prevented a court
from imposing an additional sentence on a defendant who had
completed the maximum authorized sentence. 4 ' The multiple
punishment branch also functions as a limitation on sentencing
options upon retrial after conviction. Accordingly, in North Carolina
v. Pearce,45 the Court held that the double jeopardy clause "requires
purposes of retrial and sentencing. Id. at 533. In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(1957), however, the Court limited Trono to its facts stating that "[a]ll that was before the
Court in Trono was a statutory provision against double jeopardy [in] ... the Phillippine
Islands-a territory ... with ... procedures ... alien to the common law." Id. at 197. It
rejected the waiver theory, as "totally unsound and indefensible." Id. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976), renounced the principle that "the permissibility of a retrial following a mistrial or reversal of a conviction on appeal depends on a knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right." Id. at 609-10 n. 11.
37 Justice Holmes, dissenting in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1903),
enunciated the continuing jeopardy theory: "[Liogically and rationally a man cannot be
said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be tried.
The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning to the end of the cause." See
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970) (one continuing jeopardy where defendant obtains reversal on appeal of a guilty verdict).
38 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
39 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978).
10 377 U.S. at 466.
41 437 U.S. at 15, 18.
42 Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1976).
'3 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
44 Id. at 176.
4 395 U.S. 711 (1968).
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that credit must be given for punishment already endured."4 6
The Court added, however, that "the guarantee against double
jeopardy imposes no restrictions upon the length of a sentence
imposed upon reconviction." 4 7 Both of these aspects of the
multiple punishment ban can be characterized as constitutionally
mandated judicial deference to the legislature's judgment on
appropriate sentences. 4 8 The Court in United States v. Benz, 4"
however, offered a more attenuated application of the multiple
punishment ban. In holding that a district court could decrease a
sentence upon petition by a defendant, the Court noted in dicta
that "to increase the penalty is to subject the defendant to double
punishment for the same offense in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution .
-50 Although one federal
circuit court has attempted to portray the Benz dicta as a principle
no broader than that stated in Lange,-" Benz clearly cast doubt on
the validity of government appeals under the DSO provisions.5 2

46 Id. at 717.

17 Id. at 719 (emphasis added). The due process clause, however, requires that the
longer sentence must be based on defendant's conduct after the original sentencing. Id. at
726.
48 The Court in Pearce noted that, were the defendant not given credit for time served,
the court upon retrial could sentence him to the statutory maximum causing his total time
served to exceed that maximum. The Court found this to be a "flagrantly apparent" constitutional violation. Id. at 718. The Court went on to state that "the same principle obviously holds true whenever punishment already endured is not fully subtracted from any
new sentence imposed." Id. The principle is neither obvious nor supported by precedent.
For example, suppose a defendant has been convicted and sentenced to eight years in
prison under a statute that authorizes a maximum sentence of ten years. After appellate
reversal and retrial, the defendant has already served four years. The trial judge wants to
sentence him to the longest time possible. Under the Court's formulation, the judge may
sentence him anew to ten years but must give credit for the term served. Absent parole,
the defendant would serve a total of ten years, the statutory maximum. Under the second
part of the Pearce holding, the judge must justify the imposition of an increased sentence
to avoid a presumption of harassment in violation of due process. While it is sensible to
measure the amount of the sentence increase (i.e., the amount that the judge must justify)
in terms of the total time that will be served, only the statutory maximum and due process
limit the judge's discretion in imposing a sentence. In the situation that the Court found
"obvious"-where the total time to be served was less than the statutory maximum-the
trial judge may simply mouth the correct "credit" language to arrive at any sentence (i.e.,
total time served) he desires. In either the "flagrant" or "obvious" case, the statutory
maximum and due process protection against harassment (see Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725) are
the only bright-line limitations.
49 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
50 Id. at 307.
s' Robinson v. Warden, 455 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1972).
52 The Supreme Court's decision in Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947), cast
some doubt on the continuing vitality of the Benz dictum. In Bozza, the trial court imposed

1980]

RECENT DEVELOPMENT

723

C. ProsecutorialAppeals in Criminal Cases
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Sanges, 53 held that
federal prosecutors had no right to take an appeal in a criminal
case absent an express enabling statute.5 4 In 1907, Congress
passed the first Criminal Appeals Act permitting appeals by the
government in a limited number of situations. 5 The ambiguities
of this act, however, undermined its effectiveness. 5 6 The Criminal Appeals Act of 1970 5 7 took another tack, authorizing government appeals in all criminal cases except "where the double
jeopardy clause of the ...Constitution prohibits further prosecution." 58 Thus, while "[c]riminal appeals by the Government 'always threaten to offend the policies behind the double-jeopardy
prohibition,' "59 the Supreme Court has only recently been forced to
consider the constitutional limitations on prosecutorial appeals.6 °
In United States v. Wilson, 6' the Court offered its clearest exposition of the constitutional limits on government appeal. The

a sentence below the statutory minimum but, when informed of his error, increased the
penalty. The Court found that the judge's action did not violate the double jeopardy
clause. Furthermore, Benz is arguably inapposite where a statute specifically authorizes sentencing increases by an appellate court:
The decisions applying the dictum of United States v. Benz ... must be
understood as applying the double jeopardy clause in view of the absence of
statutory or case law authorization for sentence increase by an appellate court.
Since, according to statutory and common law, only the trial court can consider
increasing the sentence, it was necessary to determine when the sentencing proceeding in the trial court had ended and the sentence had therefore become
final. The beginning of service of sentence was a sensible point in time to select
for various reasons. ... The time when the sole sentencing proceeding ended,
once fixed, then marked the end of sentence jeopardy. Thus, those decisions
did not consider whether statutory provision of appellate review of sentences
would, by postponing sentence finality, also postpone the end of sentence
jeopardy.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 97.
53 144 U.S. 310 (1892).
5 Id. at 312.
s Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.
56 See United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307 (1970).
57 Pub. L. No. 91-644 § 14(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1880 (1972) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3731
(1976)). See Note, supra note 31, at 525-27.
58 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
5 United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 298 (1970) (quoting Will v. United States, 389
U.S. 90, 96 (1967)).
60 See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975).
61 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
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trial court in Wilson, after a guilty verdict by the jury, dismissed
the indictment on the ground of unreasonable preindictment delay. 62 The Third Circuit, relying on the Court's decision in
United States v. Sisson, 63 dismissed the government's appeal. The
court held that the government's appeal was barred by the double
jeopardy clause because the district court had relied on facts
brought out at trial in dismissing the indictment. 64 The Supreme
Court reversed, concluding "that when a judge rules in favor of
the defendant after a verdict of guilty has been entered by the
trier of fact, the Goverment may appeal from that ruling without
running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause." 65 Against the
background of prior double jeopardy decisions, the Court observed:
Although review of any ruling of law discharging a defendant
obviously enhances the likelihood of conviction and subjects
him to continuing expense and anxiety, a defendant has no
legitimate claim to benefit from an error of law when that error
could be corrected without subjecting him to a second trial before a second trier of fact. 66
The Court's treatment of Sisson is revealing. The majority of the
Court 6 7 in Sisson apparently found that a post-verdict dismissal
based on evidence adduced at trial functioned as an acquittal. 68 In
a passage not marked by clarity, the Sisson Court, relying on Ball,
implied that the double jeopardy clause barred any review of the
trial court's order. 69 The Wilson Court, however, portrayed the
result in Sisson as grounded solely on the jurisdictional restraints
of the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907.70 Thus, Wilson not only
makes clear that the government may appeal post-verdict orders
where review would not result in a new trial, but also suggests
62 Id.

at 334.

63 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
64 420 U.S. at 335.
65 Id. at 352-53.
66Id. at 345. See United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F.2d 740, 743 (2d Cir.), appeal dismissed
on government's motion, 336 U.S. 934 (1949) ("So long as the verdict of guilty remains as a
datum, the correction of errors of law in attaching the proper legal consequences to it do
not trench upon the constitutional prohibition."), quoted in United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332, 345 n.14 (1975).
67 Justice Black joined four other members of the Court to form a majority on only
one section of the opinion. 399 U.S. at 288-90.
66 Id. at 290.
69 Id. at 289-90.
70 420 U.S. at 335.

1980]

RECENT DEVELOPMENT

that appellate court review of trial evidence considered by the
lower court does not constitute "a second trial before a second
trier of fact."
II
UNITED STATES V. DIFRANCESCO

Eugene DiFrancesco was convicted of bombing and racketeering in two separate trials in the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York. 71 The government sought
an enhanced sentence-under the DSO provisions for the racketeering conviction. 72 The trial court held the prescribed sentencing hearing and concluded that DiFrancesco was a dangerous

special offender.73
The finding that DiFrancesco was a dangerous special offender triggered the possibility of two twenty-five year sentences
on the racketeering counts and sentences totalling nine years on

the bombing counts.74

The court, however, sentenced him to two

ten-year terms of imprisonment for racketeering, to be served
75
concurrently with the sentences for the bombing convictions.

The trial judge chose to increase the sentence by one year over
the maximum sentence otherwise applicable. The government
countered with its remaining weapon under the DSO provisions
by seeking review of the trial court's sentence. The Second Circuit, while upholding DiFrancesco's conviction, held that a government appeal of a sentence uncontested by the defendant vio76
lated the double jeopardy clause.
71 See United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769, 772 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3514 (Feb. 19, 1980).
72 Id. at'779.
73 Id. at 780. The district court determined DiFrancesco's
criminal history, based upon proven facts, reveals a pattern of habitual and
knowing criminal conduct of the most violent and dangerous nature against the
lives and property of the citizens of this community. It further shows the defendant's complete and utter disregard for the public safety. The defendant, by
virtue of his own criminal record, has shown himself to be a hardened habitual
criminal from whom the public must be protected for as long a period as possible. Only in that way can the public be protected from further violent and
dangerous criminal conduct by the defendant.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
at 6 n.2, United States v. DiFrancesco, 604 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W. 3514 (Feb. 19, 1980).
"1 604 F.2d at 772, 780. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976).
75 604 F.2d at 780.
6 Circuit Judges Smith and Meskill joined in the majority opinion. District Judge
Haight, from the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation, based his concur-
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The government apparently offered two arguments in support of the DSO appeals provisions. First, the government attempted to characterize the trial court's sentence as merely tentative
such that the defendant was placed in jeopardy only once. 7 In
the alternative, the government argued that, since Congress could
have structured the review provisions to place final sentencing authority in the appellate courts without impinging on defendant's
double jeopardy protections, the present DSO provisions should
also pass constitutional muster.7 8 The Second Circuit observed
that the statutory language directing that the trial judge "shall
sentence the defendant" did not admit of the government's
characterization. 7 ' Further, the court refused to consider the
DSO provisions in light of the other sentencing options available
to Congress. 8o
In support of its conclusion that the DSO provisions violated
the double jeopardy clause, the Second Circuit assembled eighty
years of dicta; all of the cited decisions predated the Supreme
Court's construction of the broad government appeals provisions
of the Criminal Appeals Act of 1970.81 All of the decisions,
echoing Benz, 8 2 suggested that the double jeopardy clause barred
an increase in a validly imposed sentence by either the trial or
appellate court. 8 3 The Court distinguished Pearce84 concluding
ring opinion on the inapplicability of § 3576 to the defendant's case. Id. at 787. Judge
Haight contended that because DiFranceso could have been sentencted to two consecutive
20-year terms without imposition of the dangerous special offender sentence, he did not
qualify under § 3575(f) for the special sentence. Judge Haight stated, however, that if his
interpretation proved incorrect, he would support the majority's constitutional analysis. Id.
at 789 n.7.
" See id. at 781-82.
78 Id. at 782.

79 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b) (1976)).
s0 Id.
81

The DiFrancescocourt cited Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States v. Benz,

282 U.S. 304 (1931); Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900); and Walsh v. Picard,
446 F.2d 1209 (lst Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1972).
82 See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
83 In Reid, the Supreme Court observed that if the double jeopardy clause applied to
military court martials, the President would not have the power to return a case to the
court martial for an increase in sentence. 354 U.S. at 37 n.68. In Murphy, the Court upheld
the imposition of a longer sentence after the first had been vacated as unlawfully applied,
but noted that a court could not "impose in invitum a second or additional sentence for the
same offense, or ... substitute one sentence for another." 177 U.S. at 160. The First Circuit,
in Walsh, upheld a Massachusetts statute that permitted an appellate court to increase a
sentence when defendant initiated the review, but stated that the double jeopardy clause
would bar the same result if the state initiated review. 446 F.2d at 1211.
84 See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
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that a higher sentence on retrial is permissible only if defendant
has initiated the review of his first conviction. 8 5 In closing, the
court emphasized the sweep of the guarantee against double
jeopardy: "'[W]here [, as here,] the Double Jeopardy Clause is
applicable, its sweep is absolute. There are no equitites to be balanced, for the Clause has declared a constitutional policy, based
on grounds which are not open to judicial examination.' "86
III
THE

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE

DSO

PROVISIONS

In an area of law devoid of clear precedents, the Second Circuit presented a plausible application of general double jeopardy
policy to government initiated review of criminal sentencing. But
a broader inquiry into underlying policy as evidenced by recent
Supreme Court decisions, particularly Wilson and Pearce, justifies
the opposite result.
The Second Circuit portrayed government appeals as a rara
avis deserving of almost a presumption against their validity. Wilson makes clear, however, that where appellate review would not
result in a second trial, government appeals of post-verdict orders
favorable to the defendant do not violate the double jeopardy
guarantee. 87 And Wilson necessarily permits appellate courts to
consider evidence adduced at trial in reviewing post-verdict orders; such review does not constitute a second trial."" The
Second Circuit's reliance on multiple punishment dicta and its
hesitancy to impose upon the defendant the burden of the
government's "second chance" obscures the fact that Wilson permits government appeals when the trial court has dismissed all
charges against the defendant.8 9 While the defendant's interests
in repose is a preeminent concern of the double jeopardy guarantee,'"' the government's appeal of an unqualified dismissal engenders more anxiety than the appeal of a sentence after conviction.
A principled distinction can be made only if the court's imposition
of a DSO sentence is characterized as an implicit acquittal of

80

604 F.2d at 785-86.

Id. at 787 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1978)).
s1 See text accompanying notes 61-70 supra.
88 See id.
89 See 420 U.S. at 333.
" See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957), quoted in text accompanying
86

note 25 supra.
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whatever "danger" or past criminal acts would justify a longer
sentence.
Pearce illustrates that such implicit acquittals should not bar
sentencing review. The double jeopardy guarantee does not
compel the same standard for sentencing as it does in the
guilt-determination context. Thus, in Green v. United States, " the
Supreme Court held that conviction for a given offense sets a ceiling on the offense chargeable on retrial..9 2 The Court stated that
it was legitimate to assume that conviction of the first offense was
an "implicit acquittal" of any higher charge. 9 3 In Pearce, however, the Court stated:
[I]t has been settled that a corollary of the power to retry a
defendant is the power, upon the defendant's reconviction, to
impose whatever sentence may be legally authorized, whether
or not it is 4 greater than the sentence imposed after the first
9

conviction..
... The Court's decision in Green v. United States ... is of

no applicability to the present problem. The Green decision was
based upon the double jeopardy provision's guarantee against
95
retrial for an offense of which the defendant was acquitted.
The Second Circuit's conclusions that Pearce turned on defendant's initiation of appellate review" cannot fully explain the different results in Pearce and Green. The cases can be distinguished
only by assuming that sentencing commands a lesser degree of
immutability than guilt-determination.
91 335 U.S. 184 (1957).
92

Id. at 189-90.

91 Id. at 190-91.
94 395 U.S. at 720.
Id. at 720 n.16. Cf. Dunsky, supra note 19, at 27 n.80:
I1
When the factfinder decides which, if any, crime the defendant has committed,
it actually resolves, correctly or not, some or all of the factual elements of the
offense charged. In contrast, when the sentencing official imposes sentence, he
does not resolve factual elements of the offense charged. He considers a
number of other factors (e.g., the rehabilitation of defendant, the deterrence of
potential offenders, the protecting of society) in making his sentencing decision.
96 604 F.2d at 786. Defendant initiation of appellate review should be significant in this
context only when it might lead to prosecutorial retaliation or harassment. Pearce was specifically concerned with the possibility of deterring a defendant's appeal because of his fear
of an increased sentence on retrial. See 395 U.S. at 725. The drafters of the DSO provisions guarded against such retaliation by providing that the government must take any
review five days before the defendant's deadline for doing so, or lose its chance to appeal.
Sentences cannot be increased on defendant's appeal alone. Additionally, both the trial
judge and the appellate judge are required to state in writing the reasons for increased
sentence. See note 16 supra. These provisions, however, were drawn in response to due
process rather than double jeopardy concerns. Cf Fisher, supra note 24, at 89-91 (harassment is inappropriate standard for invoking double jeopardy protection).
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The Second Circuit gave short shrift to the government's argument that the court should consider the permissible alternatives
open to Congress in structuring DSO review. ". 7 The Supreme
Court has been sensitive to legislative attempts to rationalize the
criminal justice system even when those attempts tread perilously
close to infringing on defendant's constitutional rights; in such
cases, the Court has carefully considered the options available to
the legislature which, although they might cut deeply against defendant's interests, are unquestionably valid. In Mullaney v. Wilbur,"8 for example, the Court invalidated a Maine homicide statute that required the defendant to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the killing occurred in the heat of passion to
rebut the statutory presumption that he committed murder." '
Two years later, the Court in Patterson v. New York""' upheld a
New York statute that defined murder as "(1) 'intent to cause the
death of another person'; and (2) 'caus[ing] the death of such person or of a third person.' "'"
The statute permitted the defendant to raise an affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. (112 The Court distinguished the Mullaney decision on the
grounds that "the New York statute involved no shifting of the
burden to the defendant to disprove any fact essential to the offense."1' 1 3 The Court observed that "under the present law, New
York will have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has intentionally killed another person, an act which it is not
disputed the State may constitutionally criminalize and
punish." 11 4 In assessing the constitutionality of the method by
which New York criminalized homicide, the Court's opinion was
informed by Chief Judge Breitel's concurring opinion from the
New York Court of Appeals, 0 5 quoted almost in its entirety. 106
While granting that the state could misuse affirmative defenses,
Judge Breitel argued that, absent affirmative defenses, the state
could simply define murder to require the intent to kill. 1 1 7 Thus,
9' See 604 U.S. at 782.
98 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
99 Id. at 702-04.
100 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
101 Id. at 198.

Id.
Id. at 201. See id. at 215-16.
1o"Id. at 209.
105 People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 305, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573,
102

113

583 (1976), aff'd sub nom. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
106 432 U.S. at 211 n.13.
1o739 N.Y.2d at 305, 347 N.E.2d at 909, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
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affirmative defenses enhance "the ameliorative aspects of a statutory scheme for the punishment of crime, rather than the other
way around.""°8 If Patterson stands for anything more than the
principle that states may evade the strictures of due process by
redefining the elements of an offense, it shows that courts should
consider the constitutional alternatives to the statute in question.
Congress considered at least two other sentencing schemes
before settling on the present DSO appeal provisions. The first
would allow the trial court to " 'recommend' a sentence to the
appellate court, the 'recommendation' to become final if neither
side appealed .... If an appeal were taken by either side, the issue
could then be resolved de novo by the appellate court."' "9 Alternatively, the trial court could "impose a sentence that would be
'deemed' to be for the maximum, with a recommendation that the
appellate court 'reduce' the sentence to a certain level, a recommendation that would become the sentence if neither side appealed, but which would not bind the appellate court if an appeal
was taken." 110 The DiFrancesco court noted another alternative
"whereby the district court tentatively imposed the maximum
permissible sentence with provision for review and possible reduction by the court of appeals."'
Congress could also have abandoned its goal of appellate review and adopted mandatory
minimum sentences for dangerous special offenders. The first two
alternatives, although needlessly artificial, would accomplish the
same purpose as the present DSO provisions. The third would
force criminal defendants to undergo the burden of appeal
merely to obtain an individualized sentence. The last, while clearly
constitutional,"1 2 does not enlarge "the ameliorative aspects of a
statutory scheme for the punishment of crime." '3 In sum, the
Second Circuit was shortsighted in rejecting the government's
"permissible alternatives" argument. Rejection of the present DSO
, Id. at 306, 347 N.E.2d at 910, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
,,,9Hearings on S. 30 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 196 (1969) (testimony of Prof. Peter Low), reprinted in
Low, Special Offender Sentencing, 8 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 70, 90 (1969).
...Id. Arguably, Congress would, within the confines of Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204
(1978), structure DSO sentencing as a single proceeding culminating in an imposition of
the sentence by the appellate court.
"1 604 F.2d at 782 n.19.
112 See Rummel v. Estelle, 48 U.S.L.W. 4261 (Mar. 18, 1980); Spencer v. Texas, 385
U.S. 554, 559-60 (1967); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962).
113 People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 306, 347 N.E.2d 898, 910, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573,
585 (1976) (concurring opinion, Breitel, C.J.), aff'd sub nom. Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977).
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provisions may lead to far less progressive sentencing schemes.
While courts should not yield to legislative blackmail, they should
display the pragmatism clearly evident in Patterson when ruling on
the validity of criminal procedure reforms.
Regardless of the Second Circuit's comment to the contrary, 114 double jeopardy doctrine is replete with instances of
"equities to be balanced." The Supreme Court has adopted the
balancing approach as the best justification for allowing retrial to
correct trial error-' and for determining when a declaration of
mistrial permits retrial."'
Accordingly, the constitutionality of
government appeals should be tested by accommodating the
legitimate goals of the criminal justice system as well as the defendant's interests. The DSO provisions promote society's interests in
assuring that "convicted felons prone to engage in further crime
are imprisoned long enough to give to society reasonable protection""1 7 and in "improving the rationality, consistency, and effectiveness of sentencing by ... guiding sentencing discretion
through the development of sentencing criteria, procedures and
appeals.""' 8 To the extent that the Benz dictum is inconsistent
with the DSO provisions," 9 it should be seen as a product of a
time before widespread government appeals were permitted, or
even imagined.
CONCLUSION

The DSO appeal provisions are well within the double
jeopardy limitations set out by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Wilson. The provisions deal only with sentencing, which should
be judged by a lower standard than that accorded guilt-determination. They represent a civilizing reform in criminal sentencing
procedure that may be discarded only at a great cost to both society and the convicted offender. The Second Circuit's decision in
United States v. DiFrancesco should be reversed.
Claudia Bowman
14

See text accompanying note 86 supra.

See Burks v. United States. 437 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978); United States v. Tateo, 377 US.
463, 466 (1964). See also Spence, supra note 19, at 743-53; Comment, Interest Balancing: An
Alternative Approach to Resolution of Double Jeopardy Claims, 58 IOWA L. REv. 1000 (1973);
Note, supra note 19, at 328-29.
ttaSee note 32 supra; Spence, supra note 19, at 744-48; Note, supra note 19, at 328-29.
117 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 83.
'"-

'Is Id.
119 See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.

